The paper investigates a simple and natural enrichment of the usual modal language !£ = !£<O) with an auxiliary 'universal' modality [!!) having Kripke semantics: [!!) � is true at a world of a model iff � is valid in the model.
Introduction
Nowadays the propositional languages enriched with intensional operators (modalities in a broad sense) are enjoying an increasing recognition as expedient and useful environments for uniform formalizing of seemingly disintegrated situations and ideas arising in various scientifi c fields, such as computer science, artificial intelligence, linguistics, philosophy, cognitive science, etc. The expanding areas of application of (poly-) modal logics (including modal, temporal, dynamic, epistemic ones, etc.) cut across both the syntactic and semantic canons of the traditional approach to modality, featured in the classical works of Lewis, Kripke, Prior and others. On one hand, having fixed the usual syntax of the modality as a unary propositional operator, its Kripke-style semantics naturally leaves the classical paradigm reflecting the Leibnizian view on the necessity and varies over arbitrary fi rst or higher-order quantificational schemata involving the truth at the actual world of valuation and the 'accessibility' relation. An analogy can be made with the process of transition from Fregean fi rst-order quantifiers to generalized quantifiers in the contemporary researches on natural language semantics. On the other hand, the syntactic appearance of the modality can vary, too. Familiar examples are the O-ary modalities loop and re peat in dynamic logic as well as the relevant implication which can be regarded as a binary modality or Kamp's operators Since and Until in temporal logic. For a more general approach towards modality in temporal setting see also [8] .
The syntactic and semantic deviations from the classical modality yield a large variety of modal operators, increasing the expressive power of the language in one or other direction, and thus making it more adequate to the envisaged purposes. Among this variety of modalities there are several basic patterns of fundamental importance both for the expressiveness of the language and for axiomatization of the corresponding deductive machine. The most natural and simplest one, and at the same time the most useful as an auxiliary tool, is the universal modality @] which is the focus of the present paper. The universal modality is interpreted in the Kripke semantics on a frame (W, R) by the Cartesian square W 2 of the universe W, i.e. @]cp is true at a point of the model iff cp is valid in the model. Thus the main technical effect of the introduction of @] in the language is that it overcomes the restriction on the power of local (pointwise) truth imposed by the accessibility relation, and allows an expression of statements valid in the whole universe standing at any world of this universe. This ability of the universal modality has its undoubted value in all traditional interpretations of the modal language, i.e. it makes it possible to express eternal truths in temporal logic or invariance properties and partial correctness statements in logics of programs. That is why @] has been introduced, explicitly or not, many times by a number of authors, under different names and in different contexts, e.g. in temporal logic, [5] , [6] , [11] ; in dynamic logic, [22] , [23] ; in logic of programs, [1] ; and just technically, [4] , [19] , [24] , etc. These are only a few references among many. Indeed, taken in isolation, @] is nothing more than the well-known old SS-modality. The point of the present paper, however, is to regard @] just as an auxiliary modality. We aim at a systematic extraction and investigation of the effects generated by the universal modality and that is why we consider it in the classical modal environment. Nevertheless, as a rule, the results obtained in the paper readily spread over arbitrary polymodal languages with lli). Our other goal is to illustrate the typical difficulties and the challenging problems arising when enrichments, even so simple as this one, of modal languages are put to a systematic investigation.
Preliminaries
Throughout the paper we fix a propositional modal language It = It(O) of one modality 0 and its dual <> =DF-a..,. The set of formulae of It is denoted by FOR. We assume familiar the notions of frame, model, general frame, modal algebra and validity in them as well as the basic frame constructions-sub frame (this will mean generated subframe). p-morphic image, disjoint union and the basic algebraic constructions-subalgebra, homomorphic image, direct product (for exact definitions see [10] , [16] , [3] , [15] . Some notation: At � cl> [x ] means that the formula cl> is true at the world x of the model At; At � cl> means that cl> is valid in At. Notation for truth and validity in frames, general frames and modal algebras is analogous.
Also we use the categorical connections between general frames and modal algebras [10] : to each general frame gji there corresponds a modal algebra gji + and to each modal algebra "It the general frame "It + which is its Stone representation. (Here we stick to the notation of [10] .) Hereafter, frames will be freely identified, when necessary, with the full general frames based on them.
If gji is a general frame then (gji + ) + is called a Stone representation of gji, denoted also by Sr( gji). If F is a frame, then the underlying frame of (F + ) + is called an ultrafilter extension of F, denoted by ue(F). F is called an ultrafilter contraction of ue(F).
Another construction to be used is the ultraproduct of general frames (see [10] or [3] ). Note that this construction, applied to a family of frames, yields a general frame (unlike the ordinary ultraproduct of frames) since it regards frames as full general frames. That is why we call it a general ultraproduct.
Denote the language obtained from It adding the universal modality @]
(and its dual 4Y) by � and the set of formulae of It@] by FO�. Here are some basic notions for the new language.
A frame for It@] (�-frame ) is a frame (W, R, W2) which will be identified with (W, R). Operators 0 and (ill on subsets of the universe are defined in a frame F = (W, R) as follows:
{w ifX=W
OX={xeW/R(x)s;; X} and Iill X= 0 . . otherwise 81 
Using the Universal Modality
Itfm-model is a pair (F, V) where F is a frame and V is a valuation of the variables, extended to FORt.J via the usual clauses for If and V(@l4» = @l V(4)>.
The notion of general If'Jirframe is also defined in due standard way as a pair (F, W) where F = (W, R) is a frame and W £;; P(W) is closed under the Boolean operations, 0 and @I. Clearly, the operator @) does not impose extra closure conditions and so we can identify (general) If-frames with (general) Itfm-frames. An .Pm-algebra is a non-trivial modal algebra with an additional unary operator @I, satisfying the condition:
for each element a. Let Mm! be the class of all Itfm-algebras. It is easy to see that the Itfm-algebras are exactly those bimodal algebras which are isomor phic to fJ' + where fJ'is a general �-frame. The notions of validity (F) in Itfm-models, general Itfm-frames, IfIID-frames and IfIK)-algebras are defined in the standard way. Closed formulae in IfIID are the Boolean combinations of fo rmulae, beginning with @I.
Here we sketch several specific effects of the enriched language. The universal modality makes it possible to express global properties (for the whole model or frame) by means of local (pointwise) ones. This is grounded on the obvious fact that truth of a closed formula at a point (local validity) is equivalent to validity of this formula in the whole model (global validity). Here are some issues of this effect:
(1) Global validity of any IfIID-formula 4> is equivalent to local validity of @l4> ;
(2) Global consequence r 1= 4> (meaning that for every model Al F r implies All: 4» equivalent to local consequence @I(r) 1:, 4> (meaning that for every model Al and point x in it, AlI:@I(r)[x) implies AlI=4>[x», where @I(r) = {@lyly Er}; this is equivalent to the validity 1:@I(r)-> 4> when r is finite.
Analogous effect appears in first -order definability [3): an IflID"formula 4> is (globally) first-order definable iff @l4> is locally first-order definable.
3. Modal definability In :t1ID 3.1. Classes of algebras and frames, modally definable In IfIID If C is a class of IfIID-frames then the modal theory of C, MTIID( C), is the set of all IfIID-formulae valid in C. If r is a set of Itfm-formulae then FR(r) is the class of fr ames in which the formulae of r are valid.
A class of fr ames C is modally definable in 2(jj] (2(jj] -definable) if there exists a set f £; FO� such that for each frame F: FE C iff F F f.
The class of the modally definable classes of frames in 2(jj] will be denoted by MD (2(jj] ). We will describe the .!l@-definability in a model-theoretic fashion, by means of closure under certain constructions. For this purpose we will define some operators on classes of algebras and fr ames. Let A be a class of algebras of some signature Q. Then we denote by I(A) (S(A), H(A), P(A), U(A» the class of all isomorphic copies (subalgebras, homomorphic images, direct products, ultraproducts) of algebras from A. Analogously, let C be a class of frames. Then we denote by 1,( C) (H,( C), U,( C) , SR( C), E,, (C), C.(C» the class C extended with all isomorphic copies (p-morphic images, ultraproducts, Stone representations, ultrafilter extensions, ultrafil ter contractions) of frames from C.
The same notation will be used for classes of general frames. The definitions and notations for modally definable classes and modally definable closures of classes of general frames, models and modal algebras are in the same spirit.
The following results in this section are obtained as close analogues to those in [13] where definability in the bimodal language 2(R, -R) (with modalities both over a relation and its complement) is studied. That is why the proofs will be omitted or just sketched. LEMMA 
3.1
MIuu consists of simple algebras (without proper congruences).
PROOF. Let "Il E �, a, bE "Il, a '* b and for some congruence" in "Il, a"b.
PROOF. By Lemma 3.1 and Jonsson's result that every subdirectly ir reducible algebra in a variety generated by a class K of algebras with distributive lattices of congruences, belongs to HSU(K). #
As a consequence, a class of 2(jj] -algebras is modally definable iff it is closed under isomorphisms, subalgebras and ultraproducts. A well-known model-theoretic result implies that the 21l!1-definable classes of algebras are exactly the universal classes. Now we shall define specifically for ..'l1m, a simpler version of the notion of SA-construction introduced by Goldblatt and Thomason [12] and used to characterize if-definability.
DEFINITION
Let fF = (W, R, W) and F' = (W', R'). F' is said to be a [ill -collapse of fF iff F'+ is subalgebra of fF + .
It can be shown (similarly to Lemma 3.10 from [13] ) that the above definition means that there exists a complete atomic subalgebra of fF + , fFt = (W, R, W,)+ such that W' is the set of atoms of fF; + , for each a, b E W' :R'ab iff a!; Ob (i.e. '<Ix Ea 3y E bRxy) and the fo llowing condition holds:
Let C be a class of general frames. The class of all [ill -collapses of C will be denoted by �(C).
From Lemma 2.2 it follows:
A class of frames C is in MD(21l!1) iff it is closed under isomorphisms and [ill -collapses of general ultraproducts.
The essential difference between this characterization and the classical result of Goldblatt and Thomason [12] is due to the fact that in the enriched language the notions of (generated) subframe and disjoint union of frames are trivialized.
A class of frames C is tl.-elementary iff there is a set � of fo rmulae of the first-order language with equality and a binary predicate symbol R, such that for each frame F, F E C iff F 1= �. (ii) A tl. [12) and [18] ) because a class of frames can be defined by a set of formulae or sequents but not axiomatized by this set.)
The class of modally sequent-definable classes in .2' will be denoted by MSD(.P).
PROOF. Let a class C be defined by a set of sequents E . For each sequent C1= (r, a) EE we define 4>. EFO�:
It is easy to see, using 1.1, that for each model .At:
defi ned by the set of formulae {4>./C1EE}.
#
The opposite inclusion will be proved using a kind of normal form of the formulae of .Pnu.
DEFlNmoN
(1) An elementary conjunction (disjunction) is any formula of the type
(2) A conjunctive form, CF for short (disjunctive form, OF), is any conjunction (disjunction) of elementary disjunctions (conjunctions).
By a standard argument, each CF is equivalent to a OF and vice versa. So, by form we will mean either CF or OF. PROPOSITION 
3.6
For each formula q, and closed fo rmula 1jJ,
PROOF. Standard semantic arguments, using 1.1.
For each q, E FORu.J there is a form equivalent to q,.
PROOF. By induction on q,. The Boolean steps are standard. Let q, = 01jJ and 1jJ
and Proposition 3.6(a) guarantees that all 01jJ ,s have equivalent elementary disjunctions and so q, has an equivalent CF. For q, = @J1jJ, the proof is the same, using Proposition 3.6(b).
# DEFINITION
Let q, E FORu.J and q,' be a CF equivalent to q" q,
) and finally we put 1"( q,') = -':(1jJ;) 1\ ••• 1\ -': (1jJ;) and -.: (q,) = -.: (q,').
-.:( q,) will be called a sequential closure of q,. Note that 1"( q,) is a formula without nested occurrences of [!!] . The circumstance that a formula can have many equivalent sequential closures will be harmless.
For every .'ern-model At and an elementary disjunction
Thus, every .'ern-formula is equivalent to its sequential closure with respect to validity in models. Obviously, every conjunctive member of -.:( q,) equivalent, with respect to validity in an .'l'wrmodel (hence in a frame), to the corresponding sequent ("Xo, {X, x" ... , X,,}). This observation and Theorem 3. 7 yield an equivalence between sequential definability in .'l' and definability in .'l'1i1l:
Moreover, definability and sequential definability coincide in each poly modal language having [!!] explicitly definable. Now, Theorem 7 from [18] is directly translated into .'l'1i1l:
COROLLARY 3. 9 A 6-elementary class of frames is MD in .'ern iff it is closed under p-morphisms and ultrafilter contractions.
Thus, for �-elementary classes of frames, closedness under @I-collapses turns out to be equivalent to closedness under p-morphisms and ultrafilter contractions-a result which can be proved directly, too.
In particular, a first-order condition is definable in ..P[ill iff it is preserved under p-morphisms and ultrafilter contractions. For instance , Vx--.Rxx and 3xRxx are not definable in :t@ since the former fails after an appropriate p-morphism (e.g. the only mapping from ({x, y}, { (x, y >, (y, x>} > onto ( { u }, { ( u , u > } » and the latter fails after an appropriate ultrafilter contrac tion (e.g. if N is the set of natural number then (N, <> � 3xRxx but ue«N, < » � 3xRxx).
This result is carried over into multimodal enrichments of I£ which have @I explicitly defi nable. It has some methodological value: frequently such enrichments have non-standard semantics extending the standard ones because the semantic connections between the different modalities may not be syntactically expressible. So, let L be a fi rst-order definable logic in such an enrichment of ..P which is proved to be complete with respect to the class NS(L) of non-standard L-frames. Now the problem arises how to prove completeness with respect to the class of standard L-frames S(L), if it holds. Extending a well-known result from Fine (7) we can conclude that L is canonical, hence complete with respect to the class DNS(L) of (non standard) L-frames which carry descriptive (see (10) ) general frames. If L is complete with respect to S(L) then NS(L) = [S(L» ) = CuH,(S(L», hence DNS(L) s; CuHr(S(L», so E.(DNS(L» s; H,(S(L». But it is easy to see that every frame F which carry a descriptive general frame is a p-morphic image of its ultrafi lter extension. Indeed, if � = (F, W) then � + is a subalgebra of F+ hence if � is descriptive then � "" (�+)+ is a p-morphic image of (F+) + hence F is a p-morphic image of ue(F). Thus we obtain DNS(L) s; H,Eu(DNS(L» s; ... ,Hr(S(L» = Hr(S(L». This calculation means that if standard completeness hold for L one must be able to prove it as fo llows: for any L-consistent formula <p take a canonical L-frame F (non-standard in general) satisfying <p and then construct a p-morphic counter-image of F which is a standard L-frame (using, for example, the 'copying' technique, (9) , (14 ), [2 7)). If one succeeds in this, the standard completeness of L is proved. 
2?l!lJ"" loglcs
In this section we consider normal modal logics in ..'l'1ID. First we have to define the minimal normal .'l'1ID-logic, i.e. the analogue of K. Here are several obviously valid schemata:
These schemata determine that @I is an SS-modality with corresponding equivalence relation U containing the relation R corresponding to O. This does not guarantee that U is a universal relation but this property cannot be expressed by means of model formulae since it is not preserved in disjoint unions. Indeed, we shall see (as a consequence of the completeness theorem) that the above schemata are all we can say about @I. The extension of the minimal normal modal logic K with these schemata and the rule will be called KIY].
Note that the rule (NEC1.J), combined with (incl), makes the rule
So we have another semantics, larger than the one envisaged thus far, namely, models over frames (W, R, U) where U is an equivalence relation containing R. These frames, when U,* W2, will be called non-standard frames for -'l@ and the frames (W, R, W2) will be standard ones. Analogous terminology will be accepted for general frames and models over standard and non-standard frames. Now two general notions of completeness arise: completeness with respect to the general semantics and completeness with respect to the standard one. Of course we are interested in the latter, but, with SS in mind, it is clear that these two notions are equivalent since each generated subframe (as a bi-relational frame) of an -'l@-frame is a standard %frame and each formula refuted in a frame is refuted in some of its generated subframes. Combining the above observations with the usual canonical model technique we obtain the general model-completeness theorem for 21Y]-logics: THEOREM 4.1 All -'l@-logics are complete with respect to the class of their standard 21Y]-models.
In particular KIY] is complete with respect to the standard -'l@-frames, i.e. it is actually the minimal normal -'l@-Iogic.
We shall investigate in detail a special class of -'l@-Iogics, axiomatized by classical schemata over KIY].
DEFINITION
Given an 2-logic L, the minimal extension of L in 21Y] is the simple extension � of KIY] with the schemata of L, spread over -'l@.
Let us make a simple observation. If V is a valuation on a frame and r a set of formulae, we denote V[f] = {V(</»I </> e f}. 
Minimal extensions and transfer of properties
The notion of minimal extension appears every time an enrichment of a propositional language is considered. A general question of transfer of properties is connected with this notion: Let rY' be some property of logics. Is it the case that if an ..'t'-Iogic L enjoys the property rY' then so does its minimal extension in the enriched language?
As a rule it is not difficult to prove such results for particular logics but the general problems seem hard. Let us observe that, due to conservativeness of the minimal extensions, the transfer of incompleteness is obvious.
The problems to be overcome while proving completeness of ..'t'@J -logics seem to be the same as those for ..'t'-Iogics (the universal modality is not expected to introduce new difficulties) so the methods will be the same too. Anyway, one should surely prefer not to re-create here all familiar completeness achievements in the usual modal logics but to effortlessly transfer as many of them as possible to the enriched language. So, the following seems quite plausible and desirable:
If an ..'t'-Iogic L is complete, then its minimal extension YID is complete too .
We will make a digression from ..'t'@J in order to translate the problem into an equivalent one in the classical language ..'t' .
DEFINITION
Let L be an ..'t'-Iogic and <p, 1/J E FOR.
(1) A normal <p-theory over L, denoted by ThL( <P), is the set of fo rmulae derivable from L U {<P} using MP and NEC; every 1/J E ThL( <P) is said to be normally derivable from <p over L, denoted q>�L 1jJ;
(2) 1/J is a model consequence of <p over L , notation <p �L 1jJ, if for each L-model At: At � <p implies At � 1jJ; Let us note that the reader should not consider the adjective 'sequential', used above and henceforth, with its traditionally accepted logical etymology, although there are certain reasons for that. It is just a more or less appropriate name for a (at least defi nitively) new kind of completeness, decidability, etc.
So Conjecture 2 states that the sequential completeness is not stronger than the ordinary one. So far the Conjectures 1 and 2 are open but we are going to prove that they actually claim the same. 
(1) A set of formulae r is normally satisfi able in a logic L if r is satisfiable in a normal L-model; (2) r is locally normally satisfiable in L if every finite subset of r is normally satisfiable in L; (3) A logic L is compact if every locally normally satisfiable in L set is normally satisfiable in L; (4) A logic L is strongly complete if every L-consistent set is normally satisfiable in L. Actually, strong completeness = frame-completeness + compactness.
Let L be an .:t-Iogic and </I, tjJ E FOR. Let us note that, as a consequence of 5. 1, </I If tjJ is equivalent to L-consistency of the set {.,tjJ} u O'W)</I. So, an equivalent definition of sequential completeness is: L is sequentially complete if every L-consistent set of formulae of the kind {tjJ} u 0 ''' ')</1 is normally satisfiable in L. This condition corresponds to a particular case of compactness: call a logic L sequentially compact if it is compact with respect to all sets of the kind {tjJ} u 0''' ')</1. Thus: an .:t-Iogic L is sequentially complete ilf it is complete and sequentially compact. THEOREM 5.5 Let L be an �-Iogic.
(1) L is compact iff � is compact; (2) L is strongly complete iff LuiJ is strongly complete. 6.,=FORn6., 6.2={�x/�xe6.} and 6.3= {[ill X/[ill xe6.}. Put 6.;= U {X , OX, ... , O·X, ... /@]x e 6.,}. 6., U 6.; is locally normally satisfi able in � (because 6., U 6.3 is) hence in L. Then 6., U 6.; is satisfied at a point x of a normal L-model Al.,. We can choose this model to be generated by x. Further, for every �X e 6." the set 6.; U {X} is locally normally satisfiable in 4m hence satisfi able at the root of some normal L-model .At.. Finally, take At to be the disjoint union of .M.. , and all .At. for �X e 6.2• Then At is a normal L-model (hence LIi1l-model) which satisfies 6., hence r, at x. (2) is proved in the same way since completeness implies (consistency = local normal satisfi ability).
#
Note that, by virtue of a result in Fine [7] , all fi rst-order definable complete logics are strongly complete (being canonical) hence sequentially complete and their minimal extensions in �[ID are strongly complete too. In particular, for every strongly complete (e.g. canonical) logic, Conjectures 1 and 2 hold.
Here is a sufficient condition for sequential compactness.
PROPOSITION 5.6
If an �-Iogic L contains a theorem of the type O'p->omp for some m, k such that m > k, then L is sequentially compact.
PROOF. Let LrO'p->Omp, m>k. Then a set {X} U O(W)<P is normally satisfiable in L iff {X} uO(m-')<p is such, since for each n ""=m a formula O ' p -> O·p is a theorem of L for some integer r, such that k :5 r < m. (More exactly, we can choose r = OF k + r" where T" is the remainder of n -k modulo m-k.).
#
Thus, for example, every complete extension of K4 is sequentially complete. As one of the referees hints, the above statement can be obviously strengthened: if L r (p "DP " ... "O·p)->on+ , p for some n, then L is sequentially compact. Now we can show that strong completeness is stronger than sequential completeness. For example ,
which is sequentially complete (being a complete extension of K4) but not compact [16] .
By the way, here is a sufficient model-theoretic condition for compactness.
PROOF. FR(L) is closed under generated subframes, disjoint unions and isomorphisms, therefore closedness under ultrapowers implies closedness under ultraproducts (see [3] . 8.2). Now, let S be a locally normally satisfi able in L set and Sf be the set of all finite subsets of S. The above results show that, if our Conjectures 1 and 2 are not true, a counter-example should be a relatively weak, complete but not compact extension of K.
Wa rning (Vakarelov, personal communication) . The results about transfer of completeness do not carry over to completeness results with respect to classes of frames, defined through additional semantic conditions, inexpres sible syntactically. For instance, the logic S4.3 is complete w.r.t. the class of all linear orderings LO [25] but is characterized by the class of weak linear orderings WLO. However, S4.%1 (which is characterized by WLO too, thanks to 5.2, the canonicity of S4.3 and 4.5) is not complete W.r.t. LO since the formula @]([]P -> q) v @](Oq-> p) is true in LO and not true in WLO, hence not a theorem of S4.3@.
Let us notice that another, easily achieved transfer (as pointed out by one of the referees) concerns canonicily in the classically adopted sense: ( [7] ) a logic L is called canonical if every frame carrying a descriptive general L-frame is an L-frame itself. Now, if L is an ..'t-Iogic and ;ji is descriptive regarded as a standard general �-frame then it is descriptive as an L-frame, too. This obviously leads to transfer of canonicity.
Using the Universal Modality /21
5.2. Transfer of finite completeness In �IID Now we shall consider transfer of finite completeness. Of course, we can confine ourselves to the class of standard models. We can translate the problem into �, too: DEFINITION An �-logic L is sequentially finitely complete if for each <P, 1J! E FOR such that <P li-L 1J! there exists a finite normal L-model .At such that .At F <p and .At � 1J!.
In fact, the requirement of normality of the refuting model can be dropped by virtue of the analogue of Segerberg's theorem [25) in �IID about an equivalence between finite model property (FMP) and finite frame property. Still, we can easily ascertain the transferring of the most frequently used technique for proving FMP, namely, filtration. There could be a number of different definitions of what it means for a logic to admit filtration. We shall adopt here an acceptable and general enough version of this property. We say that a logic L admits a filtration if there exists a class of L-models C such that L is complete w.r.t. C and for every model .At E C and a finite set of formulae r there exists a finite set f' containing r and closed under subformulae, such that an L-model can be obtained from .At by filtration over f' (in the usual sense, see for example [16) ). THEOREM 5. 9 If an �-Iogic L admits filtration then � does, too. PROOF. Let r s;; FO� be closed under subformulae and .At = (F, V) be an �-model. For each <p E r we take a formula <P' E FOR obtained from <p by replacing all occurrences of subformulae of the sort ffiJ'IjJ by T or J. in accordance with V(ffiJ1J!). Obviously V(<P) = V(<P'). Thus we obtain a set f' s;; FOR which is closed under subformulas, too. The sets rand f' will lead to the same filtrations since ffiJ does not add new conditions. We can obtain by filtration on r (hence on r') an L-model hence a standard Lrirmodel. The disjunction property
PROOF. Let us assume LuiJ 1I-@lI/>-->@l1/' and LuiJ II-@lt/>-->@]x . Then there exist luJ-models Alt = (W;, R" v,) and Atz = (W" R" v,) and points x, E W, and x, E W, such that At,I: t/>, Alt; 
# Through the translation r, Proposition 5.10 reduces the decision problem for LIY] to the problem of deciding provability in luJ of formulae of the form @lI/>-->@l1/' where t/>, 1/' E FOR.
We can uniformly transfer the decidability problem from ..2im to .2'.
DEFINITION
An .2'-logic L is sequentially decidable if the set of valid consequences { I/> f-L 1/'} is decidable. From 5.3 and 5.10 immediately follows
An .2'-logic L is sequentially decidable iff LuiJ is decidable.
Here we hazard a positive answer of the last question, raising
We finish this section with two more open questions. Do minimal extensions preserve complexity? Do they preserve the interpolation property?
Some uses of the universal modality
The universal modality can be a fairly useful tool for axiomatization. Here we sketch some examples demonstrating its merits.
Using the Universal Modality /23
Let us fi rst mention that the standard techniques for proving completeness and finite model property in :£ (canonical model, filtrations, etc.) work as well in :£Iill ' As we have already noticed, the canonical model technique will cause no additional complications, connected with the non-standard models, since all [i!J-rooted models are standard, which is sufficient for the purposes of the completeness. For instance it is a routine task to prove that all conditions, listed in section 3 are axiomatized by the corresponding formulae, added to KIill . Indeed, all of them but the last are canonical (note that Another curious example is due to Dimiter Vakarelov. The condition 3xRxx is definable neither in :£ nor in :£[jj) as we have already known . This condition is axiomatized in :£ by K, i.e. no part of it can be expressed there. In :£[jj) however, it is axiomatized over K[jj) by the infi nite set of axioms {On}n.'" where On = <iV«p,-> <)p ,) A ... A (Pn--<)Pn)) (without being de fined by them) . First, all frames with a reflexive world satisfy all 0.. Actually, validity of On in F = (W, R) means that for every n subsets P" ... , Pn of W there exists a world x which has R -successors in all P s containing x. In particular, if F is fi nite and W = {x" ... , xn} then F � On implies (taking the subsets {x,}, ... , {xn }) that F�3xRxx. So, the axioms { O n} ne., guarantee existence of an R-reflexive world in all finite frames which satisfy them, though not in all such infinite frames. The proof of completeness uses the standard canonical model technique: observe that if L = KIill + {O,,}n E '" and L If.</> then {<iV</>} U {Ol1'--l1'/l1' e FO�} is con sistent and hence included in a maximal L-consistent set which is reflexive.
The finitely axiomatized 2'@-logics form a lattice (unlike the finitely axiomatized 2-logics, [3] Ch. 5) as follows from the next proposition .
PROPOSITION 6.1 If L, = KIill + </>, and L 2 = KIill + </>2 are 21ill -logics and </>, and </>2 do not share common variables then L, The above fact is certainly not surprising; an analogous property is proved 24/ Using the Universal Modality by analogous arguments, for the normal extensions of S4 in Maksimova and Rybakov [21] .
The prime stimulus for considering the universal modality has come up in the context of the proper names fo r ihe possible worlds (see Passy and Tinchev [22, 23] ). They are special kinds of propositional variables evaluated in the Kripke semantics in single worlds which, added to modal and dynamic languages, strongly increase their expressiveness and deductive power. A complete axiomatization of the minimal normal logic K N in the modal language with names is given in [9] using special kinds of axiom schemata, called in [11] admissible fo rms. The names are axiomatized by the scheme M(e A A) -> L(e -> A) , where e is a name, A is a formula, M is a possibility form and L is a necessity form.
After adding the universal modality to the language, the need of admissible forms disappears because the form scheme is replaced by the axiom scheme �(e A A)->@](e->A). In addition, we can already say that each name has a denotation by means of the schema �e and thus to give a complete axiomatization of the names over K [jj] .
Using @] one could elegantly axiomatize puzzling non-classical modalities.
As an example let us consider a modality [8J with the following semantics in an ordinary Kripke model .M. = (W, R, V) :
We shall call [8J the 'iff-modality' having in mind a natural interpretation as 'necessary and sufficient' (see [9] ) or 'all and only ' [17] . This is a fairly strange modality: neither monotonic, nor anti-monotonic, but extensional; no formula of the kind �I/> or its negation is universally valid.
Humberstone [17] has axiomatized [8J by means of an infinite set of schemata and an infinite set of rules. Adding the universal modality to the language we can replace that really ingenious axiomatics by the following transparent one in the language .'f(� , [ill ): Axiom schemata of the logic IFF:
(1) all propositional tautologies; (2) SS axioms for @]; Rxy iff (@1JI E X and 1JI E Y for some 1JI) or (y = w' and �1JI <l-x for every 1JI»
Obviously R(w) = R(w'). Consider the model (W, R, V) with the canonical valuation V: V(p) = {x E W /1JI EX} for each propositional variable p. Extend V to a valuation on all formulae through the standard semantics of [i!J and (*). Now we shall prove the truth lemma : # For each formula 1JI, V(1JI) = {x E W/1JI EX}. The only non-trivial case in the induction on 1JI is that V(�1JI) = {x/�1JI EX}. Let us fi rst observe that if Rxy, then for every e, �e E x implies e E y. Indeed, Rxy and �e E x imply �X E x and X E Y for some X. Then [i!J(X .... e) e x by @,), so X .... e e y, hence e e y.
(1) Let �1JI EX. If y E V(1JI) then by IH 1JI ey and Rxy by defi nition; if Rxy then 1JI ey by the above observation. Thus R(x) = V(1JI), so x E V(�1JI).
(2) Let �1JI <I-x. Two cases are possible: (a) for each X, �X <l-x. Therefore Rxw' but not Rxw. If 1JI <I-w' then w' e R(x)\V(1JI); if 1JIEW' then 1JIEW and so wEV(1JI)\R(x) and x <I V@1JI). 
26/ Using the Universal Modality
because of the interaction between the basic modalities but there exists an important particular case-an independent join of modal logics (cf. [26] ), without interacting axioms. A natural question is which virtues of the compounding logics are inherited in the independent join. Our result concerns join of �Ii!l -logics but after some modifi cations the technique can be applied to classical modal logics as well. Such results about transfer of basic logical properties as completeness, fi nite model property, decidability, compactness, etc., are independently obtained in a recent work of Kracht and Wolter [20] . We shall consider join of two logics but the results are readily generalized to the polymodal case (even with infinitely many modalities). Let us start with the exact definitions.
DEFINITION
Let �, = �(rn) and :e, = �@) be two modal languages and L" Lz be normal logics in �, and :e, respectively. We call the logic L, E9 Lz in �(rn , [ID axiomatized by the schemata both of L, and L2 spread over the joint language an independent join of L, and Lz.
When consider languages with [ill we modify the above definition in accordance with the particular role of the universal modality. Ta king such disjoint normal L2-models for every x E W , and proceeding in the same way we construct a I-cactus as in the definition. Repeating this procedure infi nitely many times we obtain a sequence of cactuses and finally an infi nitary cactus .M = (W, R" R 2 , V).
We shall prove by a structural induction that for every subformula a of However, this translation seems not to be really effective since it involves again derivability in Lt EEl L 2 in order to define CD(.p, "'). Now, let us note that the results of section 5 are easily generalized for polymodal logics, i.e. a polymodal logic is (finitely) sequentially complete iff its minimal extension in �IID is (finitely) complete. Since the constructions join and minimal extension commute, we obtain:
The independent join over �@) of the minimal extensions of normal �-logics Lt and Lz coincides with the minimal extension of the independent join of Lt and L 2 • COROLLARY 7.3 The independent join over �@) of complete minimal extensions of normal �-logics Lt and L 2 is complete, too.
Modifying the technique used in the proof of Theorem 7.1 one can obtain similar results concerning strong completeness and compactness of inde pendent join of minimal extensions. Then, as a corollary of Theorem 5.5 these results can be transferred to usual �-logics.
As for independent join over �(@]) of arbitrary �IID -logics, the generali zation of Theorem 7.1 is another open problem.
